We describe a model-based approach to select cost effective countermeasures for an information and communication technology infrastructure under attack by intelligent agents. Each agent tries to reach some predefined goals through a sequence of attacks. The proposed approach builds models of the infrastructure and of the agents and then it applies a Monte Carlo method that runs multiple, independent simulations of the agent attacks. These simulations produce a statistical sample that is used to assess the risk. The selection of countermeasures works in an iterative way where each iteration selects some countermeasures and applies the Monte Carlo method to evaluate any residual risk. In this way, it takes into account that an intelligent agent may select distinct attacks to replace those affected by the countermeasures. To improve cost effectiveness, the selection focuses on useful attacks to reach a goal. The Haruspex suite is an integrated set of tool to support this approach. Some of its tools build the models of the agents and the one of the system. Another tool uses these models to apply the Monte Carlo method and simulate the agent attacks. This tool is iteratively invoked by the one that select countermeasures. We describe the adoption of the suite to assess and manage the risk of three industrial control systems.
3 and the manager that automatically manage the risk. We describe how these tools interact to select cost effective countermeasures and to handle the agent reactions. Furthermore, we apply the whole suite to assess and manage the risk of three versions of an industrial control system.
A reduced version of this paper as been presented to the "Parallel and Distributed Processing 2015 conference".
RELATED WORKS
We outline the contribution of the Haruspex suite by reviewing related works on attacks, plans, their description, and risk evaluation. [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] analyze the simulation of attacks against an ICT or a critical infrastructure without applying the Monte Carlo method. [10, 11] discuss intelligent, goal-oriented agents with reference to terrorism. [12] presents a formal model of agent sequences similar to the one of the Haruspex suite because it defines both pre and post condition of attacks. However, it does not discuss the probability an agent reaches a goal. [13] describes the prerequisites and the effects of attacks and pairs each attack with the proper countermeasure. [10, 14, 15] describe how the deployment of countermeasures affects the agents. None of these papers take into account sequences of attacks. [9] discusses the modeling of agents with partial information and [16] defines a notion of look-ahead but in a different perspective than Haruspex. [17, 18] analyze the simulation of agent attacks in the framework of game theory. The Haruspex suite adopts a distinct approach as it aims to reduce the probability that some agents reach their goals rather than diverting the agents to a distinct target [19, 20] . [21] adopts a game theory framework to determine how to protect alternative targets of an attacker. Instead, we focus on how to minimize the investment to protect a single target. [22, 23] survey agent-based simulation, whereas [24, 25] model the components of a critical infrastructure as agents to simulate it and discover dependencies among components. [26] discusses the measurement of ICT risk while [27] focuses on the risk of software systems. [28] reviews the problems posed by a Delphi approach. [29, 30, 31] review multi objective optimization that underlies agent selection strategies. [32] discusses the relation between planning and attack sequences under the assumption that agents access accurate and complete information on the target system.
Our agent model is more general than previous ones because agents can access partial information on the target system. Furthermore, we are not interested in the optimal sequence or in the optimal strategy to select a sequence [33] . Instead, our goal is an accurate modeling of how agents:
• acquire information on the target system, • select an attack sequence, • change the sequence they implement when countermeasures are deployed.
Most works on attack sequences neglect the selection of countermeasures. This is likely due to the lack of formal models to compute the success probability of a sequence. [34] proposes a taxonomy focused on a series of security incidents. The classification in [35] maps each vulnerability into just one class. The theoretical approach in [36] analyzes sequences of attacks involving distinct infrastructure nodes and it is focused on the compromised level of a node. This approach cannot 4 the probability that sq enables ag to reach g discover all the sequences because their number is exponential in the one of attacks. [37] defines a language to model attack scenarios. [38] describes the discovery of agent sequences and it analyzes each sequence in isolation to compute its success probability. This neglects the probability that an agent selects a sequence. [39, 40, 41] discuss the modeling and the selection of countermeasures through attack graphs but it neglects the success probability of a sequence. [42] considers goal oriented attackers. Attack sequences are also important to detect attacks. Some authors have investigated attack correlation to discover attacks in the same sequence [43, 44, 45] . [46] specifies a formal model to correlate the alerts from an intrusion detection system to discover those in the same sequence.
HARUSPEX SUITE: RISK ASSESSMENT
The builder, the descriptor, and the engine are the three tools of the suite to support risk assessment in a scenario where some agents attack an ICT infrastructure S. The builder produces the model of S starting from the output of a vulnerability scanning. The descriptor builds the model of each agent starting from the parameters the assessment supplies. The two tools minimize the complexity of model building and increase both the accuracy of the assessment and the complexity of the scenarios it can consider. The engine uses the models built by the two tools to apply the Monte Carlo Method and produce a database with the samples to assess the risk. Table I defines the acronyms used in this paper. 
The Builder
The builder returns a modular model that decomposes S into a set of components, each defining some operations. Some vulnerabilities in a component c enable one or more attacks to illegally acquire some access rights, or rights, to invoke some operations. Vulnerability in c may be either known or suspected. A known vulnerability is already public. Instead, the assessment assume that each suspected vulnerability may be discovered and become public in the future. By specifying suspected vulnerabilities an assessment can adopt a what-if approach to discover how some newly discovered vulnerabilities affect the overall risk. As an example, the assessment may be interested in evaluating how a vulnerability enabling a SQL injection against a web server influences the overall risk. We pair each suspected vulnerability with the probability it becomes public at each time t. pre(at) and post(at), the pre and the post conditions of an attack at are two set of rights that describe, respectively, the rights an agent should own to implement at and those that at grants if it is successful.
The input of the builder is a database with the output of the vulnerability scanning of each node n of S. The scanning of n discovers the components it returns and returns a list of their public vulnerabilities. The user can apply distinct scanners to distinct nodes and it can also insert, remove or edit, any vulnerability in the database before transmitting it to the builder.
At first the builder classifies each vulnerability v in its input database into one of seven classes. Vulnerabilities in the same class enable attacks with similar pre and post conditions. As an example, one class includes all the vulnerabilities that only agents with an account on the node can exploit. Vulnerabilities that even agents without an account can exploit belong to a distinct class because they enable attacks with distinct preconditions. The classification of v is driven by the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) description of the attacks it enables. The CVE [47] is a defacto standard for vulnerability description. The builder deduces from the CVE description of v and from its Common Vulnerability Scoring System score [48] other attributes of the attacks that v enables such as the pre and post conditions, the success probabilities and the execution time. We refer to [2, 49] for a detailed discussion of the current implementation of the builder and the accuracy of the classification.
The model of S also describes the attack surfaces of each node n. This surface includes any attack an agent can launch against n from another node of S and it describes how an agent can propagate its attacks among nodes. The builder computes the surface of n by merging information on the vulnerabilities of n and on logical interconnection topology of S.
The builder stores in a database the model of S with all the information previously described.
The Descriptor
A threat agent, or agent (ag), is an attacker with the resources and the capability to violate the security policy of S to acquire one of distinct sets of access rights. Each set is a goal g of ag.
We pair g with a loss for the owner of S that occurs when, and if, ag owns the rights in g. The information on ag the user supplies to the descriptor includes its goals, the resources it can access to implement an attack, its initial rights, e.g. the operations ag is entitled to invoke, and its strategy to select the attacks to implement according to its preferences and priorities [50] . To describe this strategy, first of all we define a plan of ag. A sequence of attacks is a plan if it enables ag to reach a 6 goal and none of its subsequences satisfies the same property. Hence, no attack in a plan is useless because the agent cannot reach the goal if we remove any attack from the plan. AttGr(S, ag), the complete attack graph of ag is an oriented graph that represents all the sequences enabling ag to reach its goals. Each node n a of this graph represents a set of rights r(n a ) and each arc ar is labeled by an attack at(ar). If n s and n d are, respectively, the source node and the destination one of ar, then r(n s ) includes pre(at(ar)) and r(n d ) is the union of r(n s ) and of post(at). A node n i is the initial node of AttGr(S, ag) if r(n i ) is the initial set of rights of ag. The paths of AttGr(S, ag) from n i to any node n f where r(n f ) is a goal of ag represents the sequences ag can implement to reach its goals. When ag uses AttGr(S, ag) to select the sequence to implement, it always selects a plan, i.e. a sequence without useless attacks. However, the size of AttGr(S, ag) is so large it can be built for trivial infrastructures only. Hence, ag can build and analyze a proper subset of AttGr(S, ag). This subset is related to the current node of ag, the node of AttGr(S, ag) that describes the current rights of ag, and to λ(ag), the look-ahead of ag, a natural number. If λ(ag) = 0, then ag consider the subset of AttGr(S, ag) with the arcs leaving from its current node. ag randomly selects one of these arcs and the corresponding attack. If λ(ag) > 0, then ag considers the set C as of all the paths of AttGr(S, ag) from the current node with, at most, λ(ag) arcs. If C as is empty, then ag cannot implement any attack. Instead, if some paths in C as lead to a goal of ag, the strategy ranks the sequences corresponding to these paths only. Otherwise, it ranks the sequences corresponding to all the paths in C as . Here, ag may select a sequence with useless attacks. This show that ag can reduces the complexity of the selection by working on a proper subset of AttGr(S, ag) but, as a counterpart, it may select and implement some useless attacks.
To simulate in accurate way ag, we consider not only the time to execute the attacks but also the one to collect the information to build the proper subset of AttGr(S, ag). We assume that ag acquires information on a node n of S by a vulnerability scanning of n. This scanning returns all the vulnerabilities of the components running on n and it delays ag for a time depending on n. ag pays this overhead only the first time it ranks a sequence with an attack enabled by a vulnerability in a component on n. Hence, the time to collect information increases with the number of nodes ag scans that, in turn, increases with λ(ag). To model insiders, we pair each agent with the nodes it knows and does not need to scan.
The current version of the suite supports distinct selection strategies that correspond to distinct priorities of an agent, among them:
1. random: returns each sequence with the same probability, 2. maxprob: returns the sequence with the best success probability, 3. maxincr: returns the sequence granting the largest set of rights, 4. maxeff: returns the sequence with the best ratio between success probability and execution time.
None of these strategies neglects some sequence. As discussed in the following, this has important implications on the selection of countermeasures because an agent can select any sequence that leads to a goal.
ag implements na(ag) attacks of the sequence it has selected before invoking again its selection strategy. na(ag) determines the compromise between the selection overhead and the ability of exploiting suspected vulnerabilities as soon as they become public. Furthermore, a low value of 7 na(ag) implies that ag builds a new attack graph after just a few attacks to discover the goals it can reach from the new current node.
The Engine
The engine uses the model of S and those of the agents to run an experiment to analyze a scenario. An experiment consists of a set of independent runs that simulate, for the same time interval, the discovery of suspected vulnerabilities and the agent attacks. At each time step of a run, the engine determines which suspected vulnerabilities become public. Then, it considers each agent ag that still has to reach at least one goal and it is idle or it has just completed the execution of an attack. The engine builds the proper subset of AttGr(S, ag) and applies the selection strategy of ag. If ag cannot select a sequence it is busy for the time of the selection only and then it waits for the discovery of a suspected vulnerability. If the selection strategy returns a sequence, the engine sequentially simulates its first na(ag) attacks and ag will be busy for the time of the selection plus the sum of times to successfully execute each attack. The engine repeats an attack that fails for an user-defined number of times before selecting another sequence. The engine checks if ag has reached a goal anytime it successfully executes the sequence it has selected. If ag has reached a goal, the engine updates the corresponding impact.
The engine inserts one observation into the output database at the end of each run. Each observation records, among others, the sequence of attacks of each agent, the goals it has reached, the time to reach a goal, and the number of successful executions and failures of an attack. Then, to guarantee run independence, the engine reinitializes the state of S and of the agents when it starts a new run.
At the end of an experiment, the observations in the database define a sample to compute statistics of interest. The confidence level of these statistics depends upon the number of runs because each run returns one observation. The user can specify either the number of runs in an experiment or the confidence level for some predefined statistics. In the latter case, engine starts a new run until reaching the required level.
We have developed an highly parallel implementation of the engine that runs on an IBM cluster with 96 cores. This version is coded in Java and it achieves a linear speed up in the number of the cores.
SELECTING COUNTERMEASURES
This section describes how the planner and the manager select the countermeasures to manage the risk in a scenario. Here and in the following, for the sake of simplicity, we assume the scenario of interest includes one agent ag with one goal g. Furthermore, the owner of S specifies lowrisk, the highest success probability of ag it is willing to accept. Extensions to a set of agents and/or of goals are straightforward. 
Probability of Selecting a Sequence
Countermeasures aim to reduce succ(ag, g, sq), the probability that ag reaches g through sq, for any sequence sq that ag may implement to reach g. succ(ag, g, sq) is an increasing function of two probabilities: the one that ag selects sq and the success probability of sq. The former depends upon the selection strategy of ag, while the latter increases with the success probabilities of the attacks in sq. We approximate succ (ag, g, sq) as the percentage of the runs in an experiment where ag reaches g by implementing sq. We cannot approximate the probability that ag selects sq because we cannot discover the runs where ag initially selects sq but then it selects and implements another sequence when some attack in sq fails. Any change in succ(at) for any at in sq updates both the success probability of sq and the probability that ag selects sq. Hence, it may also change succ(ag, g, sqalt) where sqalt is a distinct sequence. A simple example is the one where ag selects a sequence according to the success probability of its attacks. The interaction between the success probability of a sequence and the one that ag selects it may change the success probability of ag when countermeasures are deployed. Due to this change, the experiment to produce the information to select countermeasures cannot return information to forecast the behavior of ag after the countermeasures are deployed. Only an experiment that considers the updated infrastructure can discover the sequences ag selects and the probabilities it reaches g through these sequences.
In light of these considerations, we have developed an iterative algorithm where the manager selects some countermeasures and then it runs a new experiment to discover the sequences ag implements and the resulting probability it reaches g. Our approach can investigate the effectiveness of some countermeasures before the actual deployment by properly updating the model of S.
Discovering Plans
To increase the cost effectiveness of countermeasures, the manager selects countermeasures by analyzing the plans of ag rather than its sequences. In this way, it avoids the deployment of countermeasures for useless attacks.
The planner is the suite tool that analyzes the database the engine returns and that maps each sequence that has enabled ag to reach g into the corresponding plan. The mapping backwards scans a sequence sq and drops any useless attack. To describe this scan, we use the following abbreviations:
• sq is a sequence of attacks that reaches g, • p(sq, g) is the plan corresponding to sq, • n is the length of sq, • sq(i) is the i − th attack of sq, where i ≤ n, • tp(sq, g) is a sequence initialized with sq(n), the last attack of sq, and • usef ul(i) the set of rights ag needs before executing sq(i) to achieve g.
Initially, usef ul(n) = pre(sq(n)) ∪ (g − post(sq(n))). Informally, ag reaches g if before executing sq(n) it owns the rights in the precondition of sq(n) and those in g that sq(n) does not grant.
The mapping algorithm removes sq(j) if and only if:
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If the first alternative is true, ag does not need the rights in post(sq(j)) because they belong neither to g nor to the precondition of a useful attack. If the second alternative is true, any right in post(sq(j)) is an initial one of ag or it belongs to the post conditions of an attack in {sq(1), ..., sq(n − 1)}. Here, ag does not need the rights in post(sq(j)) because it has already acquired them through a previous attack.
Before considering sq(j − 1), the algorithm initializes usef ul(j − 1). If sq(j) is not useless, the algorithm removes from usef ul(j) the rights in the post condition of sq(j) and adds those in its precondition. Hence, usef ul(j − 1) = (usef ul(j) − post(sq(j))) ∪ pre(sq(j)). Otherwise, sq(j) is useless and usef ul(j − 1) = usef ul(j). At the end of the scanning, p(sq, g) = tp(sq, g).
This algorithm assumes that ag never executes an attack that only grants rights it already owns. If sq interleaves several plans, the algorithm returns just one of them. We handle this case by mapping both sq and any permutation of sq that is also a sequence because the first j − 1 attacks enable the execution of the j − th one.
After mapping all the sequences, the planner computes succ(ag, g, p) as the percentage of runs where ag reaches g through any of the sequences mapped into the plan p.
Selecting Countermeasures for a Set of Plans
In the following, we assume that for any attack at we know at least one countermeasure that decreases its success probability. As an example, the patching of a vulnerability in vuln(at) results in the failure of at, while a longer encryption key reduces the probability that an agent guesses it. c(at) denotes the cost of a countermeasure for at. We pairs each attack without countermeasures with a countermeasure with an infinite cost.
The manager invokes the selector to compute a set of countermeasure to reduce the success probability of each set of plans. The selector minimizes the number of countermeasures by focusing on shared attacks because a countermeasure for an attack affects all the plans where it appears.
The selector receives a set of plans Sp each enabling ag to reach g. First of all, it pairs each attack at in these plans with Sp(at) = {i 1 , ..., i k }, the set of the indexes of the plans in Sp that share at. A set of countermeasures affects all the plans in Sp if the elements of Sa = (Sp(at))∀at ∈ Sp defines a coverage [51] of {1, ..., n}. A coverage includes one attack for each plan in Sp and its cost is the sum of the costs of its countermeasures. If some plans share several attacks and their countermeasures have the same cost, we select the countermeasure resulting in the lowest success probability of the attack. We break further ties according to the ratio between the success probability of an attack and its execution time. This ratio determines the most effective attack to reach a goal [52, 53, 38] .
The computation of a coverage neglects an attack at 1 if all the plans that share at 1 also share another attack at 2 with a cheaper countermeasure. The selector removes these attacks, computes all the coverages and it returns the one with the lowest cost. To optimize the execution time, it aborts the building of a coverage as soon as its cost exceeds the current best.
The execution time of the selector is acceptable even if the coverage problem is NP-Complete provided that the number of distinct plans is low or the plans shares a large number of attacks. Instead, the execution time sharply increases if the number of plans is large and they share a low number of attacks. However, if ag can implement a large number of distinct plans against 10 S, risk management requires an extensive redesign of S rather than the deployment of a few countermeasures.
If the selector returns a coverage with an infinite cost, then at least one plan of ag only includes attacks with no countermeasure. The probability that ag successfully implements this plan is a lower bound on the success probability of ag the owner of S has to accept.
Reducing the Success Probability of an Agent
The manager runs a first experiment and it starts a sequence of iterations. Each iteration, at first applies the planner to the output of the previous experiment to discover each plan p ag implements to reach g and succ (ag, g, p) . Then, it invokes the selector to compute the countermeasures for these plans and it updates the model of S to model the deployment. Then, the manager runs an experiment with the new model to discover how ag reacts to countermeasures. In particular, this experiment returns any new plan that ag successfully implements against the new version of S and the success probability of old and new plans. We denote the new plans as dependent ones because ag selects them only when some countermeasures affect other plans. Only a new experiment can discover dependent plans because the simulation of the attacks of ag against the previous version cannot return information on dependent plans. If, in the new experiment, the probability of selecting an old plan or a dependent one changes but the success probability of ag is still larger than lowrisk, the manager starts a new iteration. Otherwise, the manager terminates after returning the countermeasures deployed in the last version.
The number of countermeasures each iteration selects strongly depends upon the plans the selector receives. In a global approach, at the i − th iteration the manager transmits to the selector a set Sp i with the plans that ag implements in any previous iteration. Hence, the selector may return a set of countermeasures completely different from the one returned in the previous iteration. In the incremental approach, Sp i only includes the dependent plans the i − th iteration discovers. Then, the manager merges the countermeasures the selector returns with those previously deployed.
A global approach minimizes the number of countermeasures because it considers any attack some plans share independently of the iteration that discovers a plan. Instead, the incremental approach cannot anticipate the dependent plans ag implements in the following iterations and the attacks they share with those in the current one. As a counterpart, this approach minimizes the number of plans the selector receives in an iteration.
Currently, the manager adopts a global approach where Sp i includes all the plans the selector receives in the previous iterations and a subset, Cp i , of the plans ag executes in the i − th experiment. We insert plans into Cp i starting from those with the largest value of succ(ag, g, p) and stop as soon as the sum of succ(ag, g, p) for the remaining plans is lower than lowrisk. To reduce the size of Cp i when ag executes a large number of plans each with a low value of succ(ag, g, p), we bound the size of Cp i as a fixed percentage of successful plans in the i − th iteration. This reduces the computational overhead at each iteration at the expense of the number of iterations because succ(ag, g, p) may strongly increases after deploying countermeasures for other plans. As an example, this happens when some countermeasures force ag to select plans with a better success probability that it neglects before the deployment. This extends to ICT security the Braess' paradox for traffic control [54, 55] . The paradox can be explained by considering that ag neglects a plan with a higher success probability because of incomplete information on S due to a low lambda(ag).
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The case study shows two examples where the deployment of some countermeasures increase the success probability of ag.
If some countermeasures only reduce the success probability of an attack, ag may implement the same plan in two consecutive iterations even if the first one reduces the success probability of some of its attacks. We handle this, unlikely, event by deploying an increasing number of countermeasure for the plan till ag changes its selection.
Exiting the Iterations
The manager executes a finite number of iterations anytime each attack has a countermeasure that guarantees its failure. Under this condition, the deployment of a countermeasure results in the failure of any plan that shares the corresponding attack. The number of iterations is bounded because the number of plans is finite and each iteration discovers and stops at least one plan. However, the bound is unknown a priori because the manager discovers plans as agents select and implement them in an experiment. Furthermore, the decreases of the success probability of ag is not monotone.
The user can define a bound on the number of iterations. When the manager reaches this bound, it returns the best version of S it has discovered, i.e. the one with the lowest success probability of ag.
CASE STUDY AND EVALUATION OF RESULTS
We have applied the Haruspex suite to assess and manage the risk posed by ics 1 , ics 2 and ics 3 , three industrial control systems, ICSs, of a power generation plant. Each ICS includes Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, SCADA, components that control power generation. ics 1 is the current ICS of the plant. The owner of the plant runs the three assessments to select either ics 2 or ics 3 as the next ICS for the same plant. Furthermore, the owner is interested in selecting countermeasures to be deployed in each ICS.
To evaluate the robustness of the various versions of the three ICS, we use the security stress. This is a synthetic measure we have defined to simplify the description of the output of an assessment or of the deployment of some countermeasure. First of all we describe this measure and then the assessment of each ICS and the selection of a cost effective set of countermeasures.
Security Stress
In the following, we discuss the versions of each ICS that the manager considers at each iteration. We compare the robustness of these versions through the security stress, a synthetic measure we have defined to evaluate how an ICT infrastructure resists to the agent attacks. If ag attacks S to achieve g, the security stress Str S ag,g of S at time t is the probability that ag reaches g within t.
We refer to the resulting curve as a stress because it shows how S resists to ag for increasing times. S cracks when, and if, ag always reaches g. The fragility of S increases with the surface underlying Str 12 Then, the shape of S begins to change under the attacks of ag till S cracks at t 1 because ag is always successful for larger times. The value of t 1 − t 0 evaluates how long S, partially, resists to the attacks of ag before cracking. Str S ag,g is a synthetic evaluation of the robustness of S because its shape is related to some attributes of S and of the attacks ag can implement:
1. t 0 depends upon both the time to execute each attack at in the sequences to g and the length of these sequences; 2. t 1 depends upon succ(at) that determines the average number of times ag executes each attack at;
3. t 1 − t 0 depends upon the standard deviation of the length of the sequences to g.
These relations explain why Str S ag,g evaluates the robustness of S in a more accurate way than metrics that consider a single measure, such as the average time, or the average number of attacks, to reach g.
We evaluate the relative fragility of two infrastructures, S 1 and S 2 , with respect to an agent ag with a goal g by comparing Str ag,g (t). The comparison determines the time interval where an infrastructure has a higher robustness, e.g. it has a lower stress, than the other. In particular, S 1 is more robust, or less fragile, than S 2 with respect to ag in an interval of time
. This implies that in the interval, S 1 has a lower deformation than S 2 .
We approximate Str 
Selecting Countermeasures to Deploy
We briefly describe ics 1 , ics 2 and ics 3 , the three ICSs that are the targets of the assessments. Any of these ICS can be used to control the power production plan. Any of ics 1 , ics 2 and ics 3 consists of 98 nodes that are organized into some subnets. There are four kinds of subnets: Central, Power Context, Process, and Control. In any of the three ICSs, some users of the company intranet can access the nodes in a Central subnet to retrieve current and historical information on the plant. The plant operators can log to the nodes in a Power Context subnet to interact with the SCADA servers. The SCADA servers and clients that supervise and control power production belong to a Process subnet. Finally, the programmable logical component, PLC, that interacts with the devices in the plant belong to a Control subnet. Fig.1 shows the structures of ics 1 , ics 2 and ics 3 that include, respectively, five, seven and eight subnetworks. In this figure, each arrow connecting two subnets denotes a connection between two nodes of the corresponding subnets
In ics 1 , the Central subnet and the Power Context ones include, respectively, 48 and 14 nodes and they are merged into the same subnet. Process subnet 1 and 2 include, respectively, 14 and 18 nodes. Two nodes in each Process subnet are connected to those in a distinct Control subnet. Three nodes in the Central subnet are connected to nodes in the Power Context one. Two pairs of Power Context nodes are connected to nodes in a Process subnet. ics 2 splits the Central subnet into two subnets, each with 24 nodes. Lastly, ics 3 decomposes the Central subnet into three subnets, each with 16 nodes. 1  2192  5  2  1026  5  3  1042  5  4  1027  7  5  1961  7  6  1945  7  7  1960  8  8  833  10  9  455  11  10  440  12  11  0  12 We have inserted some vulnerabilities in the output of the vulnerability scanning and defined some suspected vulnerabilities to increase the complexity of the case study.
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Due to lack of space, we do not discuss the assessment of a further ICS that is structured as ics 1 but where each subnet includes half the nodes of the corresponding subnet in ics 1 . This version is the least robust one with respect to the agent attacks.
Selecting Countermeasures to Deploy
The assessment of any ICS considers some agents that initially own some rights on the Central Network and scan each node to discover its vulnerabilities. We have defined the other agent attributes to cover all the possible combinations of goals, strategies and lookahead values. The four alternative goals are the control of: For each goal, we introduce one agent that adopts the random strategy and six agents that adopt, respectively, one of the other three selection strategies and one of two lookahead values, 1 and 2. The latter value optimizes the time to discover the plans to reach a goal. In this way, the whole assessment considers 28 agents. This does not imply that all these agents will attack the target ICS but only that the assessment analyzes these agents to discover the most dangerous one, i.e. the one that results in the largest security stress.
All the experiments reach a 95% confidence level on the components that an agent attacks to reach its goal. This requires from 150.000 to 500.000 runs in each experiment. According to our experiments, the agent that reaches its goal in the shortest time is the one that aims to control the PLCs in any Control Network and adopts the maxef f strategy with λ = 2. This is the most dangerous agent for any ics i . We denote this agent as ag and analyze the output of the manager for alternative versions of any ICS. We consider countermeasures that patch the corresponding vulnerability. This results in the failure of both the corresponding attack and of all the plans sharing the attack.
For each manager iteration, the tables II, III and IV show the number of plans of ag and the one of countermeasures the selector returns. The manager computes a set of countermeasures for the three ICSs in, respectively, 5, 9 and 11 iterations. The number of plans that the countermeasures stop increases at any iteration. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the stress values of the distinct versions of, respectively, ics 1 , ics 2 and ics 3 that the manager considers in its iterations. Unit of time on the x axis is one hour. In all the figures, the stress curve of the first iteration is the one of the original ICS, without any countermeasure. By comparing the three stress curves we discover that, as expected, ics 3 is the most robust one. A comparison of the curves of the versions of any ICS the manager considers in two successive iterations shows if and how the countermeasures the manager selects in an iteration reduce the stress due to ag.
Some stress curves show that the selection ot countermeasures may increase the stress. As an example, both at the sixth iteration for ics 2 and at the eighth iteration for ics 3 , the success probabilities of ag strongly increases. For both the ICSs, the stress at the considered iteration is larger than the most of the previous stresses. To explain this increase, consider that ag aims to control any of two PLCs but the times to reach each of these goals widely differ. Initially, ag selects the longest plans due to the partial information on the ICS it has available. In particular, because of λ(ag), ag can only select the longest sequences. The deployment of countermeasures for these sequences forces ag to select the shortest ones and improves its success probability. To further confirm the complexity of predicting the success probability of an agent, in both ICSs, the next iteration selects countermeasures that result in a version with the lowest stress among those previously considered.
For any ICS, the stress curve of the last version overlaps the x-axis because the countermeasures the manager deploys in this version stop all the plans of ag. Since ag never neglects a plan, these countermeasures stop even agents that adopt distinct selection strategies.
The overall risk has been assessed and managed in an automatic way. The whole assessment has required three days. This includes the time to run a vulnerability scanning of the ICS nodes, to apply 15 the tools to build the models of interest, and to implement the experiments to assess and manage the risk. This is a noticeable improvement with respect to the time of a traditional assessment.
CONCLUSION
This paper has shown how the Haruspex suite can assess and manage the risk due to an ICT infrastructure under attack by agents that escalate their privileges through sequences of attacks. Some suite tools, the manager and the planner, compute a cost effective set of countermeasures through a sequence of Haruspex experiments. In this way, they take into account that an intelligent agent reacts to the deployment of countermeasures by selecting and implementing distinct sequences. The suite has assessed and managed in an automatic way the risk posed by three distinct ICSs to supervise and manage power production. For each ICS the tools have selected a set of countermeasures that prevents the attackers from reaching their goal. Furthermore, the suite has returned information to discover the most robust ICS. The case study has also shown some real examples where the deployment of a countermeasure increases the risk by forcing the agent to select a shortest plan. This confirms that only a sequence of experiments can compute a set of countermeasures to reduce the risk.
Future developments of the Haruspex suite concern the definition of more sophisticated agent models and the modeling of computer worms.
